The recently revealed 28-point peace plan, reportedly backed by Donald Trump, for ending the war between Russia and Ukraine offers a deeply unsettling vision. Rather than a restoration of Ukrainian sovereignty, it proposes a structural compromise that heavily favors Russia and places Ukraine in a subordinate, vulnerable position.

Trump’s Ukraine-Russia peace plan presents itself as a diplomatic solution. But the draft underscores a harsh reality in geopolitics: small or medium states may be asked to sacrifice core elements of their security and identity for the sake of a “grand bargain” between great powers.

Dissecting the Disadvantage to Ukraine

At first glance, the plan contains reassuring language: it confirms Ukraine’s sovereignty and promises “reliable security guarantees” (point 5).

Several of its provisions, however, effectively undercut that very sovereignty.

28-Point Peace Plan: Territorial Concessions and Frozen Front Lines

Under the proposal, Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk are to be recognized as de facto Russian by Ukraine, the U.S., and other parties.

Further, the lines of control in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia would be “frozen” where they currently stand. These conditions amount to formalizing and legitimizing key Russian territorial gains rather than reversing them.

The draft also envisions Ukraine withdrawing from parts of Donetsk that it still holds, turning them into a neutral demilitarized zone (point 21).

These concessions are deeply problematic. They amount to a forced compromise on Ukraine’s territorial integrity, rewarding Moscow for aggression and potentially closing the door to future reclamation.

Analysts interviewed by Al Jazeera argue that this is “catastrophic to European security,” since reducing Ukraine’s ability to defend itself makes it more exposed to renewed threats.

Military Restrictions and Security Guarantees with Strings

The plan limits Ukraine’s armed forces to 600,000 personnel (point 6), a sizable reduction from its current wartime levels. This constraint would weaken Ukraine’s capacity to deter future aggression.

Moreover, although the plan promises security guarantees, they come with highly conditional terms: for example, if Ukraine were to launch a missile at Moscow or St. Petersburg “without cause,” U.S. guarantees would be voided.

There are also questions about who would step in if Russia violates the deal: the language around a “decisive coordinated military response” is vague, and it is not clear what role the U.S. or NATO would realistically play.

Even more striking is the requirement that Ukraine amend its constitution to permanently renounce NATO membership (point 7), while NATO itself would embed in its statutes a clause that Ukraine will never be admitted. This effectively bars Ukraine from the most reliable collective defense mechanism in Europe, undermining its long-term security.

Furthermore, NATO would agree not to station troops in Ukraine (point 8), eliminating a key form of punitive deterrence. While European fighter jets would be based in nearby Poland (point 9), this is not the same as boots on Ukrainian soil, which significantly weakens direct defensive capacity.

Economic Dependencies and Conditional Reconstruction

The plan calls for using some of Russia’s frozen assets to rebuild Ukraine: approximately $100 billion would go to a Ukraine Development Fund, with additional funds potentially flowing into a U.S.-Russia joint investment vehicle (point 14).

But reconstruction funding comes not as pure grant aid; it is tied to economic arrangements that could entangle Ukraine in long-term dependencies. These include joint U.S.-Russia investments in strategic sectors like energy, data centers, and infrastructure.

Moreover, sanctions on Russia are to be lifted gradually, incentivizing Moscow’s reintegration into the global economy — potentially at the cost of Ukraine’s leverage.

Political and Legal Vulnerabilities

The plan requires Ukraine to hold elections within 100 days of a deal (point 25), which introduces political instability during a highly sensitive transitional period.

Another major point is a full amnesty for all parties involved in the war (point 26), including possibly Russian actors who committed war crimes (point 26), raising serious justice concerns.

The oversight mechanism—the “Peace Council” headed by Trump (point 27)—raises further questions about accountability, independence, and legitimacy.

Non-Nuclear Status and Shared Control

Other provisions include Ukraine reaffirming its status as a non-nuclear state (point 18), consistent with the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Also, the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant would be operated under IAEA supervision, with its electricity shared equally between Ukraine and Russia (point 19).

While on paper this ensures cooperation and oversight, it also places Ukraine in a position of dependency and reduces its control over critical infrastructure.

The Broader Lesson: When Geopolitics Demands a Sacrifice

The unequal burden imposed on Ukraine by this peace proposal offers a warning to smaller or medium powers. That in big-power diplomacy, “peace” can often be a euphemism for realpolitik compromise.

This plan demonstrates several hard truths:

1. Great Powers Can Enforce Deals on Their Terms.  The architecture of the 28-point plan reveals that the U.S. and Russia are orchestrating a deal that aligns closely with Moscow’s core demands. Ukraine is treated not as an equal negotiating partner. But the plan treats Ukraine as a territory to be managed and regulated, rather than restored.

2. Security Guarantees Are Not the Same as Alliance Membership. The conditional guarantees in the proposal lack the robustness of NATO’s Article 5. Trump touts it as a security guarantee. But they come with explicit caveats, and without foreign troops stationed in Ukraine, deterrence is weaker. For smaller states relying on external protection, this is a cautionary tale: guarantees may be conditional, fragile, and insufficient.

3. Reconstruction Aid Can Be a Tool of Influence. The reconstruction funds are not purely altruistic. It proposed to channel frozen Russian assets into economic development tied to U.S.-Russia cooperation. Thus the plan risks turning aid into a geopolitical lever. Smaller states accepting “rewards” of reconstruction must be aware that these may come with strings attached—and could compromise long-term autonomy.

4. Constitutional Changes Can Be Demanded by External Actors. For Ukraine to amend its own constitution to renounce NATO membership is not just a domestic policy issue. It is a geopolitical concession. This points to a reality where smaller states may be pressured to change their fundamental laws to accommodate the strategic interests of great powers.

5. Accountability Is Problematic When Great Powers Lead Enforcement. The proposed Peace Council, chaired by Trump, raises legitimacy questions. Who enforces compliance? How impartial is the mechanism? This asymmetric power structure risks placing Ukraine at the mercy of those who designed the deal—not its own institutions.

Conclusion

Trump’s 28-point peace plan may present itself as a brokered path to peace.

But its structure suggests something more troubling. It is a deal fashioned not for Ukraine’s strengthening, but for Russia’s consolidation, with Ukraine bearing disproportionate costs. Rather than restoring full sovereignty and strategic space, the plan institutionalizes constraints, dependencies, and concessions.

For smaller states watching or experiencing similar geopolitical pressures, this is a lesson in the realities of power politics. It shows that peace terms are often negotiated not by what is fair, but by what is expedient for great powers. Smaller nations risk being the sacrificial offering on the altar of great-power accommodation when global security is reconfigured.

Works Cited

Al Jazeera. “Trump’s New 28-Point Plan: What Does It Want Ukraine to Concede to Putin?” Al Jazeera, 20 Nov. 2025, www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/11/20/trumps-new-28-point-plan-what-does-it-want-ukraine-to-concede-to-putin.

Al Jazeera. “Trump’s 28-Point Ukraine Plan in Full: What It Means, Could It Work?” Al Jazeera, 21 Nov. 2025, www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/11/21/trumps-28-point-ukraine-plan-in-full-what-it-means-could-it-work.

The Independent. “Russia Back in G8, No Nato for Ukraine and US Paid for Upholding Peace: What Is in Trump’s 28-Point Plan to End the War?” The Independent, 21 Nov. 2025, www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-washington-nato-kyiv-moscow-b2869567.html.

Reuters. “Draft of US-backed Peace Proposal for Ukraine.” Reuters, 21 Nov. 2025, www.reuters.com/world/europe/draft-us-backed-peace-proposal-ukraine-2025-11-21/.

The Washington Post. “Proposed Peace Plan for Ukraine Leaves Country in a Delicate Position between US and Russia.” The Washington Post, 21 Nov. 2025, www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/11/21/ukraine-russia-peace-trump/05d6a570-c713-11f0-be23-3ccb704f61ac_story.html.

Sky News. “Trump’s 28-Point Ukraine-Russia Peace Plan in Full.” Sky News, 21 Nov. 2025, news.sky.com/story/trumps-28-point-ukraine-peace-plan-in-full-13473491.

About The Author

Antonio Manaytay

Antonio Manaytay is a journalist, editor, and pastor reporting for Rappler and leading the Daily Sun Chronicle. A 2024 Klima Fellow, he covers climate, governance, and grassroots resilience in the Zamboanga Peninsula.

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