ANALYSIS: Will Ferdinand Marcos Jr. Finish His Term Until 2028?
A recurring question emerges in political circles and public conversations alike as the Philippines’ political climate grows increasingly contentious: Will President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. survive the full length of his term until 2028?
It is a question rooted not in prediction but in the country’s historical cycles of instability, elite rivalries, and abrupt shifts in political alliances.
A close examination of the country’s institutional landscape, political fault lines, and the power blocs surrounding the presidency reveals no imminent threat to his hold on office. But it exposes the fragility that characterizes governance in the Philippines.
A Presidency Structurally Designed to Survive
A president’s six-year term is firmly protected under the 1987 Constitution. Removal can only occur through impeachment, resignation, death, or permanent incapacity.
In practice, impeachment has never successfully removed a sitting president. Even the most controversial figures, such as Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, relied on congressional alliances to protect themselves.
Marcos Jr. today benefits from similar institutional insulation. His control over the House leadership, strong influence in the Senate, and firm command over the national budget all reinforce his political armor.
The structure itself favors continuity rather than disruption.
The Marcos–Duterte Rift: A Political Earthquake
The biggest destabilizing factor is the dramatic rupture between the Marcos and Duterte camps. Vice President Sara Duterte’s resignation from the Marcos Cabinet, the collapse of UniTeam, and the subsequent political offensives—from Davao to national networks—have created a climate of elite confrontation.
Despite the noise, however, the numbers do not favor the Dutertes at the national level.
Marcos controls Congress. He has the loyalty of major political clans outside the Duterte bailiwick. And national agencies and coercive institutions remain aligned with Malacañang.
The rift is serious, but it has not shifted the balance of power. It weakens the administration politically but not structurally.
Managing Declining Satisfaction and Public Pressure
Marcos Jr.’s declining satisfaction ratings reflect public frustration over inflation, food prices, and governance missteps.
However, his ratings remain within tolerable levels compared to moments of crisis in past administrations. For instance, Marcos’ net satisfaction rating dropped in December 2024 only to rise in October 2025.
Economic performance remains the biggest risk area. If inflation surges again, or if rice prices spiral out of control, public dissent may intensify. But dissent does not automatically translate into removal. It only produces political cost—not political collapse.
Security Institutions Show No Signs of Restiveness
Unlike past periods of instability, there is no visible military agitation or destabilization movement that threatens to shake the civilian leadership.
The Armed Forces has, since the mid-2000s, gradually professionalized and retreated from direct political involvement.
Current tensions in the West Philippine Sea add pressure but have not created internal fractures.
In this environment, extra-constitutional threats appear minimal.
Geopolitical Headwinds Are Real, but Not Destabilizing
China’s aggression in the West Philippine Sea and the Philippines’ renewed alignment with the United States add complexity to Marcos Jr.’s strategic environment.
These pressures affect public perception and foreign policy narratives, but they rarely destabilize a presidency unless they lead to major national crises or military humiliation.
As of now, there is no such tipping point.
Conclusion: Stability, With Fragile Edges
Based on current institutional dynamics, political alignments, and security conditions, there is no immediate indicator that President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. is at risk of failing to complete his term. The presidency is structurally insulated, Congress remains firmly aligned with him, and no destabilization forces are mobilizing.
However, the fragility lies in the intensifying Marcos–Duterte conflict, inflation and economic vulnerabilities, governance missteps, and the unpredictability of Philippine elite politics.
Marcos Jr. is secure—for now.
But like all presidencies in the Philippines, stability is conditional, and the same political class that protects a president can swiftly turn against him when the winds shift.
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